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Abstract 
 
This article asks how and when external factors influence domestic political change. 
Only a limited number of studies have dealt with this question systematically. This 
contrasts with rising popularity of the democracy promotion agenda among the policy-
makers around the world. The article contends that external democracy promoters influence 
domestic processes of political change through two causal mechanisms:  through 
constraining of autocratic agents and through empowering of democratic agents. The 
analysis reveals that external democracy promoters can be effective in influencing domestic 
change; but this depends on the causal mechanism at play and democratic propensity of the 
domestic regime.  
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Introduction 
 
Is it possible to import democracy from the outside? The answer to this question is most 
likely a confident ‘no’ as regime change and subsequent democratic development are 
primarily internal processes shaped by domestic actors and long-term structural factors 
such as political culture and vibrant civil society, level of economic development and 
economic performance, geography and the presence (or absence) of natural resources. 
However, the answers to the question whether and how external factors influence the 
domestic processes of democratization might be less straightforward. On the one hand, it is 
difficult not to agree with views that most of the domestic politics has recently become 
internationalised in the context of our modern interconnected and interdependent world 
(Strange 1992; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton 1999; Collier 1991). On the other, 
however, it is extremely challenging for students of the international dimension of 
democratization to trace effectively the connections between external factors and domestic 
processes of political change and make theoretically sound generalizations across time and 
space. In other words, how can one extend the argument on the international dimension of 
democratization beyond the conventional view advanced in the 1980s that ‘external actors 
tend to play an indirect and usually marginal role’ (Schmitter, P. 1986, p.5, in O’Donnell, 
G., Schmitter, P., and L. Whitehead (eds.)) in the processes of democratization?  
One of the more straightforward ways to take further the argument of external factors’ 
domestic influences is to narrow down the scope of analysis to one of the most visibly 
manifested processes of external-domestic interactions: democracy promotion. By applying 
various democracy promotion strategies external actors aim to induce democratising states 
to achieve democratic transition and consolidation. Thus, from the analytical point of view, 
the examination of the effects of democracy promotion is more feasible in comparison to, 
say, analyses of more indirect influences of the international context such as effects of 
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globalisation and democratic diffusion. Democracy promotion activities are conscious and 
deliberate actions by the international actors to impart new mentalities, new institutions, 
and new codes of behaviour in a target country. Thus, in order to provide additional 
theoretical insights with regard to the international dimension of democratization, it is 
analytically worthwhile to treat the international context as a ‘global agent’ rather than an 
amorphous ‘structure’ with no central logic or leading actor. This article adheres to the 
agent-based view of democratization and its international dimensions, and asks: how and 
when do external factors influence domestic political change? 
Only a small number of studies attempted to answer these and other questions 
concerning the international dimensions of democratization (Whitehead (ed.) 1996 and 
2001; Pridham 2001; Burnell 2000; Knack 2004; Scott and Steele 2005; Finkel et al. 2007). 
As McFaul points out, students of both international relations and comparative politics 
have devoted little effort into answering the question whether external factors influence 
democratization (McFaul 2007, p.45). A lack of systematic studies on external dimensions 
of domestic political change contrasts with rising popularity among the policy-makers 
around the world of the ‘new policy agenda’ – the linking of development aid to the 
promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance (Crawford 2001). Especially 
in the last decade, more and more world leaders have embraced the moral and security 
benefits of democracy as a system of government. In quantitative terms, vast funds are 
being spent in various democracy promotion projects. For instance, the USAID democracy 
and governance aid expenditures escalated from $128 million in 1990 to $817 million in 
2003 (Finkel et al. 2007, p.414). Funds for democracy assistance programmes increased 
538 per cent between 1990 and 2003, as opposed to total USAID assistance, which 
increased only by 19 percent (ibid.). In recent years European bilateral donors have been 
also spending significantly more on foreign democratization aid. Thus, the UK has recently 
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surpassed Germany (traditionally the most generous democracy and development donor) in 
democracy aid spending, and since 2001 has tripled its financial allocations for democracy 
aid (Youngs 2008, p.161). Germany’s funding for democracy and development of civil 
society increased from €180 million in 2000 to €410 million in 2006 (ibid.). The European 
Commission’s European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) programme 
has also slowly grown from €100 million in 2000 to €135 million in 2007.1 Overall, both 
the U.S. and the EU spend roughly $1.5 billion a year on democracy promotion (McFaul 
2007, p.47). 
Rhetorically, policy-makers around the world explicitly praise the virtues of democracy 
promotion and democracy protection in new, fragile states. On numerous occasions the EU 
has highlighted the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance as 
strategic priorities.2 Likewise, the former American president George W. Bush emphasized 
promotion of democracy and freedom around the world as one of his top foreign policy 
objectives.3 Thus, it is clear that democracy promotion remains to be at the top of foreign 
policy agendas of many leaders and policy-makers around the world, yet systematic 
assessments of effects of such activities are still underdeveloped in the scholarly literature.  
This article aims to contribute to the literature on the international dimension of 
democratization by analysing experiences of democracy promotion and its influences on 
domestic processes of political change in three post-communist states – Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine – in the period from 1991 to 2002. Specifically, the focus is on developments 
within a single policy sector: civil and political rights such as freedoms of media and 
                                                 
1
 Annual Report 2007 on the European Communities’ Development Policy and the Implementation of External 
Assistance in 2006 (Luxembourg: European Communities, 2007), p.16. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/multimedia/publications/documents/annual-
reports/europeaid_annual_report_2007_en.pdf.  
2
 Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: 
European Union, 12 December 2003). 
3
 George W. Bush, ‘President Sworn-In To Second Term’, January 2, 2005, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html as cited in McFaul 2007, p.46. 
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expression. The paper’s analytical framework follows approaches recently advanced in the 
literature,4 which can be collectively referred to as an ‘inside-out’ critical approach.5 The 
rationale for this novel approach is straightforward: in order to grasp fully the domestic 
effects of international democracy promotion the analysis should ‘zoom in’ first at the 
domestic context and identify a set of factors that account for democratization (or lack 
thereof), and then the focus should ‘zoom out’ in order to examine how external factors 
influence the value and structure of domestic factors (McFaul 2007, p.47). Thus, it is 
assumed that external actors can influence domestic political process only indirectly by 
working with and through domestic actors: for instance, by constraining autocratic actors 
and empowering pro-democratic forces. As McFaul concludes in the end of his ‘zoom in -
zoom out’ case-study analysis of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, ‘future case studies 
structured in similar ways might eventually contribute to theory development in this under 
theorized field’(ibid., p.82). By adopting this approach and extending the analysis to three 
under-researched country-cases this article aims to contribute to further development of the 
theory on external dimensions of domestic political change.  
In general, post-Soviet states tend to be under-represented in the literature on the 
international dimension of democratization, partly because they are often regarded as either 
democratic ‘under-achievers’, or, in the worst scenario, as ‘hybrid regimes’ which combine 
elements of democratic procedures and largely pro-authoritarian practices (Diamond 2002). 
Usually these countries fall beyond the sphere of interest of the EU and other multilateral 
external actors and, as a consequence, they do not show clear links between the democracy 
promotion activities and domestic processes of democratization. However, examination of 
such cases is worthwhile as it can provide further insights to theoretical explanations of 
                                                 
4
 See, for instance, McFaul, ‘Ukraine imports democracy: external influences on the Orange revolution’ and his 
discussion of merits of ‘zoom in – zoom out’ approach, pp. 45-83; see also Pace, Seeberg and Cavatorta 2009, 
pp.3-19 and other articles in the special volume of Democratization, 16(1), 2009.  
5
 Pace et al. acknowledge contribution of Frédéric Volpi in teasing out the ‘inside-out’ framework of analysis. See 
Pace, Seeberg and Cavatorta 2009, (note 3), p. 17. 
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external actors’ effects (or lack thereof) on domestic political change and, in particular, the 
effectiveness of democracy promotion, even in the context of unfavourable domestic 
context. Therefore, applying existing theoretical and analytical frameworks to new and 
relatively unknown cases is useful for theory generation and development.  
Also, all three country cases present a number of interesting puzzles. Why, for instance, 
did the communist government in Moldova adopt most of the required human rights 
legislation within the first two years of its rule despite pessimistic predictions by media, 
opposition and scholarly community? Why did authorities in Ukraine suddenly adopt a 
number of important legislative acts such as the 1999 Framework Act on the Legal policy 
for the Protection of Human Rights and the 2001 Criminal Code after previously delaying 
the process for so many years? What can explain the degree of governmental response and 
timing of their policy decisions in these and other similar cases? On the other hand, what 
was it in the case of post-communist Belarus that made it so ‘immune’ to external 
interferences on the part of democracy promoters? Did external actors play any role in 
preventing consolidation of autocratic power in Moldova and Ukraine? If yes, how exactly 
were these effects produced? Why then were external actors powerless in Belarus? These 
are some of the empirical puzzles which this article attempts to answer.  
The article adopts a comparative case-study approach: it applies the same analytical 
framework and examines operation of two causal mechanisms – empowerment of 
democratic agents and external constraints on autocratic agents – across the three country-
cases. The cases are comparable in a number of important respects. All three country-cases 
are post-Soviet republics which share similar historical and socio-economic legacies as 
well as similar transition problems. From the early 1990s all three countries had similar 
densities of ties to the West and all three have been subject to similar exposure to 
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democracy promotion activities pursued by bilateral and multilateral external actors. Also, 
neither country has been very successful in its democratisation efforts so far.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, an analytical framework for analysing external 
and internal dimensions of domestic political changes in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine is 
discussed in detail. The second section sets out domestic context of regimes that emerged 
in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in the 1990s – early 2000s. The third section examines 
the first causal mechanism – empowerment of domestic democratic agents by European 
organizations involved in each country. The fourth section analyses the second causal 
mechanism – imposition of constraints and weakening of autocratic agents by European 
organizations.  Finally, the article draws a number of conclusions and discusses some 
policy implications. 
 
The international dimension of democratization revisited: analytical framework 
 
 
Various attempts to explain and theorise about democratization and domestic political 
change have prompted several schools of thought, which offered their own approaches to 
studying conditions and ways in which two processes take place. Broadly speaking, all these 
approaches can be classified as either structural or agency-based approaches (Schmitz and Sell 
in Grugel (ed.), 1999, pp.23-42). The proponents of the former approach (Lipset et al. 1993; 
Diamond 1992; Diamond 1996; Leftwich  1996; Helliwell  1994) tend to stress the importance 
of underlying structural conditions such as socio-economic development and a high level of 
modernization for a successful process of democratization. The advocates of the agency-based 
approaches (Karl 1990; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (eds.) 1986; Di Palma 1990; 
Przeworski 1986 and 1991) have seriously challenged the structuralist school by questioning a 
number of democratic transitions from the 1960s and 1970s, which failed to follow the 
democratization scenario even if the important structures did exist. Instead, they offered a new, 
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micro-level perspective on democratization, emphasizing the role of domestic actors, their 
preferences and reactions to existing institutional constraints in determining the pace and 
character of democratisation. However, despite fundamental theoretical differences between 
these two approaches, both ‘had in common a conviction that external factors were not of 
significant importance’ (Youngs 2001, p.4). Only recently have the scholars of democratization 
began paying more attention to the role of external variables in influencing domestic political 
change. These studies posit that the so-called international dimension should be incorporated 
into any explanation of democratization or, indeed, regime change processes, and that external 
factors such as democratic diffusion and pressures from international organizations can also 
foster domestic democratic development (Whitehead (ed.) 1996 and 2001, Whitehead 1999, 
Pridham, Herring and Sanford (eds.) 1994; Gleditch 2002; Pevehouse 2002 and 2005). 
Despite increased scholarly interest in international factors of democratization, the 
literature on its international dimensions remains to be limited in a number of important 
respects. First, there are still very few quantitative cross-national studies that measure effects of 
external factors on domestic democratic change (Knack 2004, Scott and Steele 2005, Kurtz and 
Barnes 2002, Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Linán, Mitchell A. Seligson 2007). However, as 
Pevehouse notes, the macro-oriented nature of these statistical tests makes it difficult to 
identify the particular causal processes behind the correlations of the data (Pevehouse 2005, 
p.111). Second, most of the qualitative studies on effects of democracy promotion also have a 
number of deficiencies. Perhaps, the most substantive criticism concerns a lack of theory as 
both a foundational basis and a final finding: most of these studies rarely go beyond descriptive 
analysis, tend to focus on a single case in terms of either the promoter or the promoted, and 
seldom draw on well-established theories of international relations or comparative politics. For 
instance, often the research on the role of international organisations in democratization tends 
to focus on a single institution and the particular strategy it applied (Kelley 2004a, p.425). 
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Thus, a considerable body of literature analysed the effects of the EU conditionality on general 
trends in the democratization process and, in particular, on specific domestic policies of the 
Central and East European candidate states (Henderson (ed.) 1999; Grabbe and Hughes 1998; 
Dimitrova (ed.) 2004). These studies, however, seem to disregard the vast diplomatic efforts of 
other international and regional organizations such as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as influential bilateral 
organizations such as USAID and DFID, that have been actively involved in the region.  
Also, as McFaul points out, most studies on effects of democracy promotion (Ottaway and 
Carothers  2000, Henderson 2003, McDonagh 2008) usually begin by focusing on some 
component of democracy assistance from a democracy promoter, such as political party 
assistance, rule of law programmes, civil society development or human rights reforms 
(McFaul 2007, p.46). This approach is methodologically flawed as ‘tracing the causal effect of 
one kind of foreign assistance on one dimension of democratic development in isolation from 
other variables influencing democratization is extremely difficult, while making impossible 
evaluations of progress toward democracy at the national level’ (ibid.). In order to effectively 
trace the impact of all democracy promotion activities that took place in a country one should 
focus analysis on both suppliers (democracy promoters) and consumers (domestic actors 
interacting with democracy promoters) in the democracy promotion process as domestic actors 
are the primary agents of political change and external actors ‘can influence outcomes only by 
working with and through these domestic actors’ (ibid., p.47). 
Overall, previous studies on democracy promotion have not been particularly optimistic 
about the beneficial effects of democracy promotion on target countries (Scott and Steele 2005, 
2006; Knack 2004; Youngs 2001 and 2004). However, as Finkel et al. indicate, despite 
somewhat pessimistic findings, it is premature to draw negative conclusions about the impact 
of democracy programmes (Finkel et al. 2007, p.414). Firstly, more theoretically grounded 
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assessments of democracy promotion are needed. Often existing arguments on effects of 
democracy promotion are not linked to broader theories of democratization. The article 
addresses this particular issue below. Secondly, more systematic comparative studies (large- 
and small-N) are necessary in order to trace more effectively the connections between external 
democracy promotion programmes and domestic processes of political change and to produce 
more generalizable results. 
This article draws on theoretical micro-explanations of democratization that emphasize the 
role of human agency (elite-driven or mass-pressured), institution-building, actor constellations 
and formation of preferences and strategies that affect the dynamics and trajectories of 
domestic political change (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Casper and Taylor 1996; Higley 
and Burton 2006). The paper follows Finkel et al.’s approach and perceives democracy 
promotion as ‘an externally driven, agent-based influence on democratization’ (Finkel et al. 
2007, p.411). In addition, this paper’s argument is based on those theories of democratization 
that view conflict as a driver of domestic change towards democracy and ascribe coordinated, 
non-violent mass opposition a significant role in weakening autocratic agents and, in some 
cases, even overthrowing authoritarian regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Weingast 
1997; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; Ulfelder  2005; Welzel 2007). These theories of 
democratization argue that the impetus for domestic political change towards democracy 
occurs not when the distribution of power between the incumbents and potential challengers is 
equal, which, in turn, incites both sides to compromise and negotiations, but when various 
societal forces, including the broader public, become powerful enough (through mass 
mobilisation and acquiring of various action resources) to either demand more democracy or 
protect it against authoritarian backslide.  
Building on this literature, the paper follows McFaul’s approach and treats distribution of 
power between autocratic elements within the ruling elite and pro-democratic elements within 
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society (or, in other words, ‘challengers’) as a set of independent variables for explaining 
domestic political change (McFaul 2007, p.51). The political power of autocratic ruling elites 
is conceptualised in this article as the unity among the ruling elites and their capabilities to 
control the state, the coercive capabilities of the regime, and the costs of retaining autocratic 
rule. The power of challengers is measured in a similar vein: the unity of the opposition and the 
opposition’s capacity to oppose authoritarian practices, including the access to various 
collective action resources and the ability to organise effective collection action.  
Thus, the main aim of the empirical part of this article is to analyse shifts in the distribution 
of power between autocratic incumbents and democratic challengers in the three country-cases 
during the period under investigation. Influences of external actors on such distribution of 
power and its major shifts will also be analysed. More specifically, the article contends that 
external actors engaged in various democracy promotion activities influence domestic 
processes of political change through two causal mechanisms: first, through weakening and 
constraining of autocratic agents (the ‘constraints’ mechanism), and, second, through 
strengthening and empowering of democratic agents (the ‘empowerment’ mechanism). The 
first mechanism operates when external democracy promoters impose various constraints on 
non-compliant authorities in a target country and, thus, weaken their power base and capacity 
to maintain the status quo. This is usually achieved through the use of negative conditionality: 
offer of negative incentives (various sanctions as well as explicit threats to impose these 
sanctions) in order to change a target state’s behaviour. As Burnell puts it, ‘the introduction of 
a requirement which makes offers of such support contingent on certain democratic and human 
rights conditions being met, and the exercise of conditionality – the reduction, suspension, 
withdrawal or termination of financial and economic assistance when a government’s conduct 
is judged unsatisfactory – elaborate the negative aspect’ (Burnell 2000, p. 8). Typical 
conditionality tools used by democracy promoters include gate-keeping in order to delay 
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deeper co-operation process and signing of an enhanced association agreement; imposition of 
trade barriers and embargos; suspension or withdrawal of aid; strict benchmarking and 
monitoring such as evaluation of compliance in regular reports, official requests for policy 
change that provide explicit deadlines for governmental action or introduction of external 
sanctions; suspension of dialogue and interaction with authorities of a target country.6 
The second mechanism operates when external democracy promoters aim at teaching and 
socializing domestic actors into democratic norms and practices. This can be achieved via 
either normative persuasion (teaching, convincing, arguing), or social influence (imposition of 
social rewards and punishments) of domestic actors, or through both processes. Essentially, as 
Flockhart notes, persuasion is ‘a process of convincing someone through argument and 
principled debate’ (Flockhart in Flockhart (ed.) 2005, p. 49), whereas the social influence 
mechanism as ‘a class of micro-processes that elicit pro-norm behaviour through the 
distribution of social rewards and punishments’ (Johnston 2001, p. 499). Notwithstanding these 
nuanced differences between the two socialization processes, the main aim of democracy 
promoters here is to empower pro-democratic agents within governments and societies of a 
target country, or to strengthen potential challengers (i.e. domestic opposition forces) of pro-
authoritarian incumbents. Institutional tools associated with empowerment and socialization of 
pro-democratic domestic agents usually include official statements and declarations expressing 
opinions on a target country; guidance and argumentation in written follow-up reports from 
fact-finding visits; missions in the field and ad hoc visits; project based aid and technical 
assistance; legal expert teams to guide and advise policy as it is forming; provision of 
recommendations that outline general standards for laws; twinning and training of public 
servants and politicians as well as of representatives of media and civil society.7  
                                                 
6
 For a more detailed list of institutional tools associated with conditionality see McDonagh 2008, p.146. 
7
 For a more detailed list of institutional tools associated with democratic socialization and empowerment see 
McDonagh 2008, p.146 
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Before concluding this section, it is necessary to note two important methodological 
caveats. First, democracy promotion activities are defined in this article as effective if they 
produce a desired result – further democratic advance in a target country. More specifically, a 
certain democracy promotion activity can be evaluated as effective if a target country 
undertakes a pro-democratic policy change after interaction with a European organization.  
Such conceptualisation of effectiveness is especially useful for empirical analysis because it 
contains clear benchmarks (‘interaction with an external actor’ and ‘policy change’) for sorting 
out effects produced by international democracy promoters on the domestic scene from the 
influences of other factors, including domestic. Second, the article seeks to analyse and explain 
target governments’ policy behaviour in the field of freedoms of media and expression. For 
reasons of consistency and parsimony of analysis the article examines governments’ behaviour 
in respect of the policy rather than government’s change of beliefs, preferences and identity.8 
Specifically, the focus of inquiry is on governments’ legislative compliance with international 
human rights standards and recommendations of external democracy promoters. One important 
advantage of such approach is that focus on legislative behaviour provides a consistent and 
parsimonious dependent variable that is easily identifiable when collecting and analysing the 
data. This approach does not downplay the importance of implementation in the policy process. 
Rather, adoption of necessary legislation is viewed in this article as a crucial policy stage that 
precedes the implementation stage. Hence, positive legislative changes can be perceived as a 
policy progress in the right direction. The next section sets out the domestic contexts of 
political regimes in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova in the 1990s-early 2000s. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 A number of scholars have indicated that using behaviour as a dependent variable has a number of advantages 
for the analysis of institutional effects in the domestic arena (see, for instance, Checkel 1999 and 2001; Kelley 
2004a and 2004b; Johnston 2001). 
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Setting the domestic contexts: degrees of authoritarian power in Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine 
 
In the early 1990s all three post-Soviet states embarked quite swiftly on the journey of 
democratization and economic liberalization, but by the mid-1990s most of these processes 
have ran into ground. There is a certain consensus in the literature with regard to treating most 
of the post-Soviet states (with the exception of the Baltic states) as not transitory or 
democratizing states, but as a distinct type of regime, which was labelled by various scholars 
differently: a ‘hybrid’ regime, ‘pluralism by default’, regimes with ‘feckless pluralism’, 
‘competitive authoritarianisms’ (Diamond 2002; Carothers 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). All 
these and other labels mean more or less the same: these are regimes that combine nominal 
democratic procedures such as regular elections and elected government officials, with 
authoritarian features such as excessive centralisation of power by the executive and 
clampdown of opposition forces. Interestingly, in such regimes even though democratic 
institutions may be highly flawed, both authoritarian incumbents and their opponents tend to 
take them quite seriously (Levitsky and Way 2002, p.52). Thus, each electoral cycle, during 
which both autocratic incumbents and challengers must compete for power, represented a 
certain degree of uncertainty and could potentially change the balance of power in favour of 
the challengers. Early post-communist competitive politics in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine 
was not caused by strong civil societies, strong democratic institutions or skilful democratic 
leadership, but it was caused primarily by the inability of incumbents to maintain power or 
concentrate political control (Way 2005, p.232). 
Indeed, most of the first post-communist elections in Ukraine, Moldova and, to a lesser 
extent, in Belarus were bitterly fought. Moldova suffered from unstable government coalitions 
and subsequent frequent changes in government, even between elections. Moldova has had 6 
prime ministers in the period from 1990 till now. The former prime-minister, Vasile Tarlev, 
had the longest ‘political life-span’ – 7 years in power (2001-2008). Both parliamentary and 
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presidential elections have been bitterly contested, bringing to the political scene new 
presidents and causing considerable changes in the party and ideological composition of the 
parliament. For instance, the 1994 parliamentary elections brought a new Agrarian Democratic 
Party to power and the president Mircea Snegur lost his office to the head of the legislature, 
Petru Lucinschi, in 1996. Similarly, in Ukraine, elections in the 1990s often created uncertainty 
and were considered by political elites as the main means of gaining and preserving power. In 
the 1994 parliamentary elections the incumbent president, Leonid Kravchuk, has lost to a 
challenger, Leonid Kuchma. Subsequently, Kuchma himself faced strong electoral challenges 
from the leftist opposition parties and won only 35 percent of the vote in the 1999 
parliamentary elections and 56 percent in the second round. Even Belarus in the early 1990s 
went through a period of extensive political liberalization and increased political competition, 
which came to end after the November 1996 constitutional referendum that gave the president 
Lukashenka extensive powers to control practically all state institutions, including the 
judiciary, local governments, and even the legislature. So, during the first half of the 1990s 
there was no unity among the ruling elites as such because, frequently, the challengers to 
incumbents came from within the ruling camp, not outside of it.  
The incumbent capabilities to control the authoritarian state were also limited. In the early 
and mid-1990s all three countries suffered from inefficient state institutions both at the central 
and local level. As Way points out, often such weaknesses of vertical control caused by failure 
to pay salaries or subsidies to local governments, undermined capacity of authoritarian leaders 
to control political dynamics in the regions (Way 2005, p.249). In addition to the management 
and fiscal problems coercive capabilities of ruling elites were also undermined. Incumbents in 
all three countries on several occasions found it difficult to persuade security officials to 
contain opposition. In Ukraine, for instance, President Kravchuk had to abandon plans to 
dissolve the parliament in January 1994 after the Minister of Interior disagreed with him 
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(ibid.). The fact that incumbents were not capable to effectively control the state also meant 
that electoral manipulation by incumbents was a much more difficult task in the early and mid-
1990s than in the late 1990s. Thus, during this period elections in Moldova and Ukraine were 
generally considered as free (that is, without falsification of election results) but not very fair 
as some international observers report irregularities prior to the elections such as unequal 
campaigning opportunities and bias of the electoral code rules in favour of the governmental 
party.9  
The incumbent capabilities to control the pace of economic reforms as well as the size and 
level of development of a country’s economy are also important factors influencing degrees of 
authoritarian power in the three countries. As Way points out, greater scope of state power over 
the economy makes it easier for autocrats to prevent the emergence of opposition as the private 
sector is weak or non-existent. Similarly, the size of the economy affects the degree of 
incumbent exposure to Western pressures for democratization (Way 2005, p. 235). Indeed, 
these two factors also account for differences in the degree of authoritarian power across the 
three cases. In the first half of the 1990s Moldova managed to conduct a number of market-
oriented reforms earning ‘a reputation as one of the leading reformers in the region’ (Hensel 
and Gudim in Lewis (ed.) 2004, p. 89). As a result of these reforms, Moldova’s private sector 
is estimated at around 80 per cent of the official GDP dominating in the services sector and 
agriculture (ibid.). Similarly, the Ukrainian authorities also embarked on extensive 
programmes of privatization that reduced the scope of direct government control over 
significant parts of economy and made it harder for incumbents to prevent elite defection and 
emergence of opposition (Way 2005, p. 250). As McFaul points out, Ukrainian oligarchs never 
united in support of the ancien régime: the three largest oligarchic groups did back President 
Kuchma, but thousands of smaller businesspeople supported various opposition forces, 
                                                 
9
 See, for instance, Freedom House’s ‘Nations in Transit’ Report for Moldova and Ukraine, 1995 and 1996 
respectively, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org, accessed 1 May 2009. 
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including growing in popularity Prime Minister Yushchenko (McFaul 2007, p. 53). In contrast, 
privatization reforms in Belarus under Lukashenka were more restricted and, thus, the scope of 
the state power in the economy was much greater than in Moldova and Ukraine. Strict state 
control over the economy made it easier for Lukashenka to consolidate authoritarian control as 
opportunities and resources for elites to defect were very limited.  
In terms of the size and level of development of economies, there were important 
differences among the three countries. Moldova had the lowest GDP per capita: by 1997, it was 
poorer than any other country in Central Europe, even Albania, and poorer than any former 
Soviet republic except Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with a per capita GDP of $ 527. According 
to the World Bank,10 Moldova’s real GDP fell on average by 10 per cent per year through the 
1990s. Despite high levels of competitiveness caused by ambitious privatization programmes, 
the Ukrainian economy was not very developed either: in 2003 its GDP per capita measured at 
$1,133 (Way 2005, p. 242). Ukraine’s economy began to grow in 1999 for the first time since 
independence, but Kuchma never managed to establish the state control over rents generated 
from gas and oil sales that could have been used to purchase the loyalty of potential 
challengers. In contrast, the Belarusian economy was developing at a faster rate: by 2003 its 
GDP grew to $2,248 per capita (ibid.). In addition, the authoritarian regime under Lukashenka 
benefited from significant energy subsidies provided by Russia: Belarus paid two or three 
times less for gas than Ukraine and Moldova (ibid.). This has made the authoritarian regime in 
Belarus less susceptible to Western pressures to democratise, and elite defection was less likely 
in the context of a strong and well-sustained authoritarian state. 
As this section has shown, political regimes developed in Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine in 
the 1990s cannot be characterised as transitory or democratising states. Rather they were 
regime types in themselves that combined nominal democratic features and largely 
                                                 
10
 See the World Bank data on Moldova, available at http://www.worldbank.org.md , accessed 1 May 2009. 
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authoritarian practices. The degree of authoritarian power also differed across the cases: 
Ukraine and Moldova being more competitive and, hence, less authoritarian, whereas Belarus 
by the end of the 1990s developed more or less full authoritarianism. The main factor that 
accounts for such differences is the political power of authoritarian incumbents conceptualised 
as the unity among the ruling elites and the incumbent capacity to control the state and the 
economy. Increased political power of authoritarian incumbents inevitably led to autocratic 
consolidation and weakening of the opposition. This is exactly what happened in Ukraine and 
Moldova in the early 2000s, when presidents Kuchma and Voronin, respectively, managed to 
consolidate their powers and, thus, strengthened the authoritarian regimes. Did external actors 
play any role in preventing autocratic consolidation in these countries? What were the effects 
of their democracy promotion strategies? And more importantly, how and when were they 
effective?  
 
Empowerment of pro-democratic agents and challengers: the role of European 
organizations 
 
 
As indicated in the last section competitive hybrid regimes in Moldova and Ukraine 
gradually turned into more authoritarian by the end of the 1990s-early 2000s. Paradoxically, 
Moldova became more autocratic after it was transformed into a parliamentary republic and a 
highly cohesive and centralised Communist Party came to power after winning 70 percent of 
seats in 2001. Ukraine also became more autocratic in the first decade of this century. President 
Kuchma managed to strengthen control over parliament and instituted a systematic electoral 
manipulation and intimidation of the opposition. By 1997 President Lukashenka established a 
highly closed regime with façade institutions that were totally controlled by the state.  
It is noteworthy at this point that throughout the 1990s out of the three organizations under 
consideration only the CoE and the OSCE were involved in promoting freedoms of media and 
expression in the three countries under consideration. The EU’s involvement was limited: by 
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the mid-1990s it concluded Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with Ukraine and 
Moldova (but not with Belarus), but the emphasis was initially put on economic rather than 
political cooperation. The EU did not set up any special programmes for promoting respect for 
civil and political rights either.11 The main aim of the OSCE’s and the CoE’s democracy 
promotion activities was to empower pro-democratic domestic agents via adoption of specific 
legislation on freedoms of media and expression, and via socialization of domestic actors into 
democratic practices (McDonagh 2008, pp.149-150). For instance, in the 1990s the CoE 
initiated two co-operation programmes in Moldova: on legal assistance and freedom of 
expression and media. The main institutional tools used by organizations during this period 
were organization of training courses, workshops, seminars and conferences with the 
participation of Moldovan journalists and lawmakers, and the CoE experts; and provision of 
written legal expertise on proposed legislative acts and drafts. Similarly, the OSCE’s Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) also undertook various activities aimed at 
empowerment of democratic agents: throughout the second half of the 1990s ODIHR has 
organised a number of seminars for Moldovan journalists and representatives of NGOs, 
dispatched legal expert assessment and review missions including assistance in the drafting of 
laws and practical management training for the constitutional court.12  
Similarly, despite delays in formalising relations between the CoE and Ukraine,13 the latter 
has been taking part in various democracy promotion activities activities of the CoE since 
1992: Ukraine participated in various intergovernmental co-operation and assistance 
programmes on legal reform and human rights, and it also had a special guest status in the 
                                                 
11The EU’s sole assistance programme specifically directed to protect and promote human rights in target 
countries, EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights), was established in Ukraine and 
Moldova in 1999. In 2006 the EIDHR was renamed into European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. 
12
 See the 1995 and 1997 Annual reports on OSCE activities, OSCE, Vienna, available at 
http://www.osce.org/publications/show_publication.php?a=1&grp=193&limit=6&pos=0 , accessed 10 April 
2009. 
13
 Ukraine has applied for the CoE membership in July 1992, and has been accepted into the CoE only 3 years 
later, in November 1995. 
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Parliamentary Assembly and a number of the CoE committees. Within the year of accession to 
the CoE, Ukraine was obliged to adopt a number of important legislative acts, among which 
were a framework-act on the legal policy of Ukraine for the protection of human rights, a new 
criminal code and code of criminal procedure, a new law on elections and a law on political 
parties.14 For its part, the CoE committed itself to continue providing support to Ukraine 
through intergovernmental co-operation and assistance programmes in order to facilitate 
reforms in various areas, including freedoms of media and expression.  
The main aims of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator established in Ukraine in 1999 were to 
assist the Ukrainian authorities in adapting legislation, structures and processes to the 
requirements of modern democracy via the organisation of various projects with relevant 
political actors in Ukraine.15 However, if measured in quantitative terms, the scale of the 
OSCE’s democracy promotion activities was not very significant. In the period from 1999 to 
2004 only 12 projects were initiated between the OSCE and Ukraine, out of which only three 
projects were related to promotion of freedoms of expression and media.16 In the same period 
the OSCE’s average budget for Ukraine comprised only about € 1,300,000 per annum.17 The 
EU’s EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights) programme was 
established in Ukraine in 1999. The EIDHR was designed to influence governments in target 
countries primarily through indirect means by working with local NGOs and other 
organizations of civil society, and thus, aiming at empowerment of non-state actors whose 
main task would be to check and balance the state power.  
                                                 
14
 See PACE’s Opinion No.190 (1995), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta95/EOPI190.htm, paragraphs 5 and 11, accessed 15 March 
2009. 
15
 See the official web site of the OSCE’s Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine: http://www.osce.org/ukraine/, accessed 
28 January 2008. 
16
 These three projects were: a comprehensive review of human rights legislation, provision of technical and 
practical support to the Ombudsman, and a project on promoting freedom of the media.  
17
 See the official web site of the OSCE’s Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine: http://www.osce.org/ukraine/, accessed 
28 January 2008. 
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Did these democracy promotion activities aimed primarily at the empowerment of 
democratic agents and their socialization into democratic practices have any positive effects at 
development of freedoms of media and expression in Ukraine and Moldova? The next section 
addresses this question in greater detail. Before proceeding with analysis, however, it is 
necessary to pay greater attention to establishment of relations between Belarus and European 
organizations – mainly, where did it all go wrong? 
The early years of independent Belarus promised quite good prospects for establishing 
relations between Belarus and the three European organizations. In February 1992 Belarus 
acceded to the OSCE, and in August of the same year it established diplomatic relations with 
the EU. In September 1992 Belarus gained ‘special guest’ status in the CoE, and in the same 
year became a member of a number of International Financial Institutions such as IMF, EBRD, 
and the WB. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Belarus 
was one of the earliest signed in comparison with other post-Soviet countries – in March 1995. 
However, the first signs of the CoE’s dissatisfaction with the pace and quality of reforms in 
Belarus were shown after the 1995 parliamentary elections, when the CoE’s Secretariat was 
instructed to continue co-operation with Belarus but to place increased emphasis on media 
freedoms (Wieck in Lewis (ed.) 2002, pp. 262-63). However, at that stage the CoE still opted 
for those democracy promotion activities that aimed at empowerment of domestic democratic 
agents: the main goal was ‘to teach and convince’ the Belarusian authorities of the virtues of 
democracy and the necessity to respect human rights, including civil and political rights. In 
early 1996 the Inter-Ministerial Council for Co-operation between Belarus and the CoE 
became fully operational and it had one main task – to bring Belarusian legislation into 
conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights. Also, several teaching and 
training initiatives were undertaken in the field of rule of law and support for NGOs (ibid., p. 
263). Only after Lukashenko went ahead with the referendum on constitutional changes on 24 
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November 1996 and, essentially, imposed a new, authoritarian constitution on the country, the 
CoE’s democracy promotion approaches have changed from indirect empowerment of 
democratic agents to imposition of explicit constraints on autocratic incumbents: it suspended 
Belarus’s special guest status on 13 January 1997. The other two organizations, the EU and the 
OSCE, largely echoed the CoE’s actions. The extent and effects of these constraints will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
External constraints on autocratic incumbents 
 
Despite explicit rhetoric that the authorities were working on civil and political rights 
reforms by the end of the 1990s it was clear that no real progress was made either in 
Moldova or in Ukraine. By 2000 Moldova still lacked legislation that would guarantee and 
protect freedoms of expression and information including new Criminal and Criminal 
Procedure Codes, Civil Code, Law on Press, Law on National Broadcasting Company. 
Moreover, the draft Penal and Civil Codes, which the national legislature approved on 
several occasions during 1997 – 2001, contained provisions that negatively affected 
freedom of expression. These included excessive penalties for the publication of the state 
secret, for defamation, for insulting a judge, a public prosecutor, or a member of the police 
force, for civil disobedience and for the profanation of state symbols. In 2002 both 
Freedom House and Amnesty International reported deterioration in freedom of the press in 
Moldova and identified domination of the ruling party as the main cause for it.18 The 
number of applications from Moldovan citizens to the European Court for Human Rights 
(ECHR) has almost doubled in 2000 and 2001 in comparison to previous years.19  
                                                 
18
 See the 2002 FH’s report on freedom of the press in Moldova, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2002, accessed 13 March 2008.  See the 2002 AI 
report on human rights in Moldova, available at http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Mda-summary-eng, accessed 
13 March 2008. 
19
 See the ECHR’s ‘Surveys of Activities 2002’, 33,  
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In addition, a number of incompatible with international standards laws on media were 
adopted: they deliberately contained vague definitions, which allowed the authorities to 
easily manipulate the political system and further consolidate authoritarian power. For 
instance, in 1995 the Moldovan parliament passed the Law on Audiovisual Broadcasting. 
Interestingly enough, no European organization was involved in drafting the law. The law 
was so vague that after 1995 it went through a number of misinterpretations and 
misapplications as well as inadmissible interference by the legislative and executive 
branches.20 Surprisingly, despite such obvious limitations, there was hardly any reaction on 
the part of organizations. Representatives of several Moldovan NGOs dealing with human 
rights acknowledged the link between European organizations’ non-engagement and the 
low democratic quality of the law: ‘Without support from international institutions, we 
were on our own in protesting the law. The law would have been more meaningful if 
international institutions would have been involved’.21 The government’s position on this 
specific law changed, however, in 2002 when the CoE became directly involved with the 
issue and imposed explicit constraints on the authorities. 
In the second half of the 1990s the legislation process on freedoms of media and 
expression in Ukraine was also very slow. Some legislative acts, which would contain 
important provisions on freedoms of media and expression, were still missing, including a 
framework act on legal policy of Ukraine for protection of human rights, a new criminal 
code and code of criminal procedure, and a new law on political parties. Moreover, some 
media laws in Ukraine did not comply with international human rights standards and 
contained a number of serious shortcomings. For instance, the 1993 Law on Television and 
                                                                                                                                                          
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADA993B5-8591-42BA-80F5-
CD26A6E598B8/0/SurveyofActivities2002.pdf, accessed 15 March 2008. 
20
 Author’s interview with Raisa Apolschii, Parliamentary Advocate on Human Rights, 2003 to present, Chisinau, 
16 June 2005. 
21
 Author’s interview with Serghei Ostaf, Deputy Chairman of the Moldovan Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights, 26 June 2005, Chisinau; Author’s interview with Paul Strutzescu, Chairman, The League for Defence of 
Human Rights in Moldova (LADOM), Chisinau, 1 July 2005. 
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Radio Broadcasting contained too many vague definitions, gave too much power to 
legislative and executive branches of government in regulating broadcasting, and assigned 
a priority right to use national transmission networks to state broadcasters.22 Another 
illustrative case is the 1998 Law on Coverage Procedure by Mass Media of the 
Performance of State Authorities and Local Self-Government. As an international human 
rights consultant indicated, the general approach of this law to freedom of expression was 
problematic and some provisions of the law were particularly harmful: for instance, rules 
on the accreditation of journalists, editorial independence, and the National Television 
Company and National Radio Company.23 
In addition, President Kuchma managed to pass a number of regulations that often 
changed the rules of the game in the media market and allowed for more efficient media 
manipulation. For instance, in June 1999 the Cabinet of Ministers increased tenfold the 
annual charge for using radio frequencies for the period 1 July – 31 December 1999. This 
regulation also made the procedure of obtaining permits for the use of transmitters very 
complicated, which led to several regional channels discontinuing broadcasting.24 In 
September 1998 the President signed another decree – ‘On Improvement of State 
Management in the Area of Information’. Essentially, this decree established a state 
monopoly in the area of printing and distribution of publications – it provided for the 
creation of two state-owned companies Ukrteleradio and Ukrpoligrafizdat, which held 100 
per cent of the shares in the state publishing enterprises and TV and radio companies. As a 
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 See ‘Review and Analysis of Laws of Ukraine’ by Karol Jakubowicz,  Chairman, the CoE’s Steering 
Committee on Media and New Communication Services, published by the OSCE’s Representative on Freedom of 
Media and Council of Europe, 
www.humanrights.coe.int/Media/atcm/2001/Ukraine/Analysis%20Jakubowicz%20%20(EN).rtf, accessed 16 
April 2008. 
23
 See ‘Analysis and Comments on Law of Ukraine on Coverage Procedure by the Mass Media of the 
Performance of State Authorities and Local Self-Government Bodies in Ukraine’ by Lene Wendland, Consultant 
on Human Rights Law, published by, Geneva: 27 November 2001, pp.9-14. 
24
 ‘Current situation of media in Ukraine’ by Freimut Duve, The Representative on Freedom of the Media, the 
OSCE, 1 March 2000, 2-3, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2000/03/2273_en.pdf, accessed 16 
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result of this decree, several situations occurred where Ukrpoligrafizdat confiscated 
premises and property from local newspapers, or simply refused publication of more 
critically oriented newspapers.25  
For the period 1991-1999 Freedom House assigned Ukraine a score of 3 (‘partly free’) 
for political rights, and a score of 4 (‘partly free’) for civil liberties.26 Moreover, the 
Political Rights score worsened and fell from 3 to 4 in 2000-2004. A separate Freedom 
House measure for the independent media (available from 1997 onwards) in Ukraine for 
the period 1997-2003 averaged at about 5, which puts Ukraine at the lowest range of the 
“partly free” category.27 Control and censorship of the media reached a new peak in 1999, 
at the beginning of Kuchma’s re-election campaign. It seems very likely that Kuchma was 
at least indirectly involved in the murder of an independent journalist, Georgii Gongadze, 
in 2000.28 In November 2000 the Gongadze case ‘detonated’ a protest movement across 
Ukraine under the slogan “Ukraine Without Kuchma”, which was later labelled by scholars 
as the Kuchmagate crisis (Wilson 2005; Kuzio 2005; Way 2005). 
The regress in freedoms of the media in all three countries was noticed by the European 
organizations. Organizations gradually switched their policies and actions from indirect 
methods aimed to empower pro-democratic agents (individuals, political institutions, and 
civic organizations) through democratic socialization to more direct modes of involvement 
aimed at weakening and constraining autocratic agents in power. In some cases 
organizations imposed direct constraints on autocratic leaders which changed the balance 
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 Ibid. 
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 For more details about the Freedom House’s annual surveys, special reports and methodology, see 
http://www.freedomhouse.org, accessed 14 September 2008. 
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 States are labelled as “not free” by Freedom House if the combined average of political rights and civil liberties 
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accessed 14 September 2008. 
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 For a detailed journalistic investigation of Georgii Gongadze’s death see J.V. Koshiw, ‘Beheaded: The killing 
of a journalist’ (Artemia Press Ltd: Reading, UK; 2003). 
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of power between incumbents and challengers and prevented the full-scale consolidation of 
autocracy.  
In the Moldovan case involvement of European organizations in solving the standoff 
between the ruling communist party and the main opposition party (the Christian-
Democratic Party of Moldova) in February and March of 2002 provides a good illustration 
to this point. The political crisis intensified after 22 January 2002, when the government 
suspended the activities of the opposition Popular Christian Democratic Party (PPCD) for 
one month. In response, European organizations applied concerted pressure towards the 
Moldovan authorities. On 17 January the PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE) 
Chairman Lord Russell-Johnston met with President to discuss the matter, and on 30 
January the European Commission urged the authorities to annul the suspension of 
PPCD.29 Initially there was no reaction from the government but only after the CoE 
demanded from the government to provide explanations on ‘how the restrictions on the 
PPCD comply with articles in the European Convention on Human Rights covering 
elections, freedom of thought, expression and organization’ by 22 February,30 the response 
from the authorities was quick to follow. Already on 8 February the one-month suspension 
of the PPCD was lifted and this allowed the PPCD to participate in electoral campaigning 
for the April 2002 local elections. The Justice Minister Ion Morei confirmed that this 
decision ‘reflected a response to the concerns expressed by the CoE over the suspension’.31 
Thus, organizations applied explicit constraints towards the authorities: clear deadlines 
were indicated for change of the government’s position, and secondly, implicit threats 
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 RFE/RL Newsline, 31 January 2002, accessed 14 March 2008. 
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 RFE/RL Newsline, 5 February 2002, accessed 14 March 2008. 
31
 RFE/RL Newsline, 11 February 2002, accessed 15 March 2008. 
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concerning Moldova’s membership in the COE and its compliance with the COE’s human 
rights acquis were voiced.32 
In March 2002 there was a new wave of protests on the streets on Chisinau. This time 
the main demands of the anti-communist demonstrators were the end of country’s 
‘information blockade’ and, specifically, the transformation of Teleradio Moldova, the 
state-owned television and radio company into a national public service modelled on 
Western public broadcasters like the BBC. The Parliamentary Assembly of the COE 
(PACE), acting as mediator between the Communist government and the opposition, 
demanded immediate reforms of freedoms of expression and media, including 
transformation of Teleradio Moldova, in its Resolution 1280 of 24 April 2002 and 
explicitly requested completion of these reforms by 31 July 2002.33 In March and April 
2002 the OSCE Chairman in Office Jaime Gama expressed on several occasions concerns 
about confrontation between the government and protesters and ‘called on both sides to 
show restraint and engage in dialogue’.34 It is also noteworthy that these organizations’ 
demands were fully backed by the USAID, the largest bilateral donor in Moldova: on 20 
March 2002 the U.S. Foreign Minister Colin Powell also threatened to stop all U.S. 
programmes of technical assistance to Moldova, as well as those assisting Moldova in its 
relations with international financial institutions (IFIs) and for achieving European 
integration in case of non-compliance with organizations’ demands.35  
On the 26 July 2002, 5 days before the expiration of the deadline set by the CoE, a new 
law on the national public broadcasting company Teleradio-Moldova was adopted, 
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 At the same time a more explicit threat of Moldova’s COE membership withdrawal was expressed by the 
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 RFE/RL Newsline, 27 March 2002 and 8 April 2002, accessed 1 May 2008. 
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 RFE/RL Newsline, 28 March 2002, accessed 1 May 2008. 
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opposition was given a prime time slot on the national television channel for preparing its 
own programme, as well as free space in the national press. Discussion above shows that 
European organizations and other external actors were able to influence domestic policy-
making process only when they opted for imposition of explicit constraints on the 
authorities. Crucially, such direct and concerted action on the part of external actors 
interfered with the authorities’ plans to impose stricter media control and reduce 
availability of collective action resources for the opposition.  
Similarly, the Ukrainian authorities were more receptive to European organizations when 
they explicitly demanded media reforms and exercised credible threats towards the 
authorities. For instance, in its December 1998 report on ‘Honouring of Obligations and 
Commitments by Member States’ the CoE criticised the authorities for serious interference 
with freedom of expression through the imposition of unfair financial penalties and outright 
closure of newspapers that were critical of the President and his administration.36 The 
report also argued that the significant control by the state over the media encouraged 
censorship, and libel and defamation suits became effective means of intimidating 
journalists.37 The CoE PACE reporters Severinsen and Kelam concluded that Ukraine had 
not made substantial progress in honouring its obligations as a member state of the Council 
and proposed a number of constraining measures: continuation of the CoE’s monitoring 
procedure of Ukraine, adoption of a resolution to bar the Ukrainian delegation and 
suspension of its representatives from the Council’s Committee of Ministers unless such 
progress had been made by the time of the June 1999 PACE session.  
The PACE reporters, Kelam and Severinsen, undertook another fact-finding visit to Kyiv 
on 9-12 May 1999 and found that no progress had been achieved between January and 
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 Council of Europe press release, 30 March 1998; Holos Ukrainy 1 April 1998 as cited in Bojcun 2001, 43. 
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 Kelam and Severinsen,  as cited in Bojcun 2001, 44. 
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April 1999.38 Remarkably, already on 14 May 1999, a few days after the PACE reporters 
had left Ukraine, the speaker of the Ukrainian legislature gave direct instructions to the 
parliamentary committee for human rights, national minorities and interethnic relations to 
prepare a draft bill ‘On the Basis for the State Policy of Ukraine in the Field of Human 
Rights’ for consideration by the legislature, Verkhovna Rada. On 17 June 1999 (4 days 
before the initial deadline of 21 June 1999, set out by the PACE in its January 1999 
Resolution No.1179, expired)39 the Rada adopted a framework act on Ukraine’s legal 
policy of human rights.  
The situation repeated in April 2001 when the CoE adopted a new resolution on Ukraine, 
in which it made similar threats of possible expulsion from the CoE and gave a new 
deadline for reforms of freedoms of the media and expression: the June 2001 session.40 
And again the authorities complied with requirements and adopted a new Criminal Code in 
April 2001: the new Criminal Code represented an important step in protection of 
journalists in Ukraine because it introduced harsher punishments against those convicted of 
harassing or persecuting journalists. Thus, these two particular cases show that the CoE 
gained more leverage over the pace of human rights reforms in Ukraine when it started 
formulating precise tasks and setting concrete deadlines for their fulfilment.  
However, in the early 2000s the state’s intervention in the media’s coverage of daily 
events and news became more frequent and blunt. Almost half of the 727 Ukrainian 
journalists polled in November 2002 believed that physical retaliation by criminal elements 
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or the state authorities was possible with the publication of critical materials.41 In its 2002 
Worldwide Press Freedom Index, the international NGO ‘Reporters Without Borders’ 
listed Ukraine 112th out of 139 countries in terms of journalistic freedom and government 
efforts to guarantee freedom of expression.42 This rapid deterioration in political rights and 
civil freedoms indicate that European organizations did not influence the domestic policy 
process much.  
Certainly, domestic factors such as increasing abilities of the autocratic incumbent to 
control the state, weakness and lack of unity among domestic opposition forces account 
well for the country’s backslide towards full autocracy. However, as a number of authors 
indicate, the organizations’ democracy promotion strategies played a certain negative role 
too: their policies and actions were rather declaratory and not very credible for the 
domestic ruling elites (Kubicek 2005; Pavliuk 2001a and 2001b; Wolczuk 2003). For 
instance, in June 1999 the CoE did not fulfil its earlier threat (made in January 1999) to 
start the suspension procedure of Ukraine from its right of representation in the Committee 
of Ministers if no progress in honouring commitments was made43 and decided to give the 
authorities more time. The EU’s High Representative for its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, Javier Solana, pointed out in an interview to a Ukrainian newspaper in 2000 – just 
before the Kuchmagate scandal broke – that ‘over the years, Ukraine has committed itself 
to moving towards a fully functioning democracy, and the results are already very clear to 
see’.44 A joint statement from the EU-Ukraine Summit in September 2001 did not mention 
the murdered journalist Georgii Gongadze by name, while praising Kuchma’s own 
                                                 
41
 Freedom House Special Report 2004, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=383&report=17, accessed 5 May 2009. 
42
 See Reporters Without Borders. ‘Press Freedom Index’, October 2002, available at 
http://www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=4118, accessed 1 October 2008. 
43
  See PACE Resolution 1179 on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Ukraine, 27 January 1999, 
available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta99/ERES1179.htm, accessed 12 
April 2009. 
44
 Zerkalo nedeli (Kyiv), 2000 as cited in Kubicek 2005, p. 279 
 31 
commitments to the rule of law, human rights and democracy.45 Surprisingly, in summer 
2001, at the peak of the Kuchmagate crisis, there had been no discussion of a cut-off or 
curtailment in democracy aid to Ukraine (Kubicek 2005, p.279). Therefore, European 
organizations did not employ constraints towards autocratic ruling elites in a systematic 
manner, which undermined their credibility and made continuation of the autocratic rule by 
Kuchma less costly.  
The case of Belarus is especially interesting when discussing the role of credible and 
direct external constraints. As a response to Lukashenka’s actions to consolidate autocratic 
power, the CoE suspended Belarus’s special guest status on 13 January 1997. 
Intergovernmental activities to assist the approximation of Belarusian legislation to CoE’s 
standards were discontinued, and Belarus was not invited to the Second Summit of the CoE 
in Strasbourg in October 1997. The EU adopted a similar to the CoE’s approach: it did not 
recognise the 1996 constitution of Belarus, and political ties between the EU and Belarus 
were effectively suspended. In 1997 the EU Council of Ministers decided on a number of 
explicit sanctions: the PCA (Partnership and Co-operation Agreement) was not to be 
ratified along with the 1996 interim agreement on trade, Belarusian membership of the CoE 
was not supported, bilateral relations at ministerial level were suspended, and EU technical 
assistance programmes were frozen. The OSCE has largely echoed the EU’s and the CoE’s 
reactions and also explicitly condemned unlawful change of the Belarusian constitution 
initiated by Lukashenko.  
However, these explicit strategies of constraining an autocratic incumbent and 
preventing further consolidation of authoritarian power failed to change the status quo and 
improve situation with civil and political rights in Belarus. Moreover, continuation of 
external activities aimed at empowerment of potential democratic challengers was not 
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fruitful either. For instance, in contrast to the EU’s and CoE’s refusals to co-operate further 
with the Belarusian authorities, the OSCE continued to be present on Belarusian political 
scene after the 1996 referendum. In 1997 the OSCE established its Advisory and 
Monitoring Group (AMG) in Minsk with a mandate to train and consult the Belarusian 
authorities on electoral and human rights legislation, to monitor and report on political 
events and situation with human rights, and, crucially, to work out political compromise 
between the authorities and the opposition. Unfortunately, the AMG’s efforts to empower 
democratic agents in Belarus failed to produce any visible results. The situation with media 
freedoms has not changed and even worsened: the most common problems appeared to be 
direct censorship by the state institutions, seizure of equipment, massive inspections, 
interference in editorial independence and, above all, criminal charges and reprimand. The 
AMG’s negotiations with the government turned out to be controversial and culminated in 
a public clash between the Head of the AMG Office in Minsk, Hans-Georg Wieck, and 
President Lukashanka in May 2000 (Wieck in Lewis (ed.) 2002, p. 270). After a number of 
diplomatic scandals between the two sides the activities of the AMG in Belarus practically 
came to a standstill in the early 2000s.  
 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This article set out to evaluate experiences and effects of external democracy promotion 
in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The main aim was to explore whether external actors 
influenced domestic processes of political change in these three countries and to analyse 
more closely operation of two causal mechanisms – empowerment of pro-democratic 
agents and imposition of constraints on autocratic agents – through which external actors 
interact with domestic actors and exert their influence.  
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The analysis produced three major findings. First, the paper’s findings are consistent 
with the recent trend emphasizing external factors in studies of domestic political change 
and democratization (Brinks and Coppenge 2006; Gleditch 2002; Pevehouse 2005; 
Whitehead; Finkel et al. 2007). On numerous occasions European organisations were active 
and effective participants in the domestic policy process. Evidence has shown that 
organisations were able to exert influence on domestic governments and bring about the 
organisations’ preferred policy outcomes. More importantly, governments tried to or in 
some cases did adopt undemocratic laws when organisations were not involved. When 
organizations interfered more actively, the governments reversed their policies. Thus, the 
finding of democracy promotion effects supports theoretical idea of both external and 
agent-based sources of democratic change.  
Second, it seems that two causal mechanisms that facilitated interaction between 
external and internal actors produced different effects on domestic policy change. 
Organizations’ democracy promotion activities aimed at empowerment of pro-democratic 
agents (both in the ruling circles and in opposition) were less effective than the ones aimed 
at weakening and constraining autocratic agents. Empirical analysis shows that softer, 
socialization-based democracy promotion activities aimed at teaching and persuading, and, 
therefore, empowering domestic actors to adhere to democratic behaviour failed to cause 
significant policy changes. A lot of training and twinning programmes have been organised 
for local journalists, politicians and members of civic organizations, and a vast amount of 
legal expertise was provided. But deterioration of civil and political freedoms in all three 
countries in the second half of the 1990s demonstrates that these softer democracy 
promotion activities did not empower domestic democratic agents sufficiently in order to 
counteract rising autocratic power. In contrast, European organisations could influence 
domestic policy more effectively only when they applied direct and explicit constraints on 
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autocratic incumbents. Thus, European organizations’ constraints imposed on the 
Moldovan authorities during the political standoff with the opposition in the early 2000s 
were of crucial importance: suspension of the oppositionist party was lifted and the 
government complied with organizations’ demands to pursue legislative reforms on 
freedoms of media. Similarly, in Ukraine adoption of long-awaited legislation or 
amendment of the existing undemocratic legislation happened only after organizations, 
primarily the CoE, explicitly put pressure on autocratic authorities.  
A note on operation of casual mechanisms is necessary. The two causal mechanisms 
under consideration are not mutually exclusive. Most likely, any democracy promotion 
process includes both: empowerment of pro-democratic agents and imposition of 
constraints on autocratic agents occur simultaneously in any democracy promotion process. 
That is, by empowering pro-democratic agents external actors also put certain limits on 
state power (thus, making consolidation of autocratic power less probable), and vice versa, 
by imposing constraints on autocratic agents external actors facilitate development of 
democratic forces in a society. But the fact that policy changes occurred only when 
organisations issued explicit warnings and set out concrete deadlines for policy reforms 
indicates that causal impact of the constraints mechanism was greater than that of the 
empowerment mechanism.  
The third finding of the paper relates to the role of domestic factors. Without a doubt, 
given peculiarities of competitive authoritarian domestic regimes that emerged in most of 
the post-Soviet states, domestic variables should be ascribed primary explanatory role in 
affecting outcomes of political change in Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus in the 1990s-early 
2000s. At best, external actors play secondary or intervening role that is conditioned to a 
great extent by domestic factors. In some cases (primarily in Moldova and Ukraine), due to 
more competitive nature of authoritarian regimes and more vulnerable position of 
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autocratic incumbents in both the domestic and international scenes, organizations were 
able to overcome growing power of autocratic incumbents and impede the full-scale 
consolidation of autocracy. In other cases, however, external actors were powerless. The 
Belarusian case illustrates this point well. Increasing capacity of the autocratic incumbent, 
severity of the government’s repression of opponents, the government’s unchallenged 
domination over all aspects of political, economic and social life provide solid explanations 
for Belarus’s authoritarian backslide. European organizations were not able to initiate shifts 
in the distribution of power between autocratic incumbents and democratic challengers 
either via empowerment of the latter, or imposition of constraints on the former.  
 Important policy lessons for those more optimistic about effects of democracy 
promotion are to be learned from this article. The most important question from the policy 
perspective is not whether external democracy promotion works or not, but, rather, when 
and how external actors can influence domestic processes and, hence, promote democratic 
development. Careful consideration of domestic contexts is crucial here. It is certainly 
impossible to impose or manufacture democracy from the outside. But external actors’ 
constructive engagement with autocratic incumbents is absolutely necessary in order to 
prevent a full-scale consolidation of autocracy. Thus, in the context of more vulnerable 
competitive authoritarian regimes external policies aimed at weakening and constraining of 
autocratic agents rather than policies aimed at teaching and socializing domestic actors into 
democratic practices represent a more efficient way to influence domestic policy change 
from the outside.  
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